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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS' 
RULE 60(b) MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT IN QUESTION, 
Appellee Knudson raises a single argument in opposition to 
the argument pursuant to Rule 60(b) presented in the Brief of 
Appellant ATGF.1 Knudson's sole argument is that ATGF failed to 
make a facial showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or 
excusable neglect. Below, ATGF will describe the basis for 
finding, first, surprise on the part of ATGF; second, mistake on 
the part of the Trial Court; and third, excusable neglect on the 
part of ATGF. Each requires that the judgment in question be set 
aside. 
Justice requires that the decision of the Trial Court be set 
aside. There is a strong preference in the law that cases be 
decided upon their merits. The Utah Supreme Court stated in 
Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Aala Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 
1980), "where there is doubt about whether a default should be set 
aside, the doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so, to the 
end that each party may have an opportunity to present his side of 
the controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance with 
law and justice." Id. at 371. 
1
 For purposes of clarity and brevity, Appellants Attorneys' Title 
Guaranty Fund, Inc., Edward Rollins and Shanen Rollins are herein 
referred to collectively at "ATGF." 
1 
Attorneys rely upon the foregoing statement of the law. If 
the Courts adhere to this statement of the law only in published 
opinions, but not in day-to-day practice, then the judicial 
process suffers immeasurably. 
A. A Showing of Surprise Has Been Made. 
The Trial Court made several statements that were relied upon 
by ATGF and which resulted in surprise. The Trial Court stated 
that "The Court will not rule on deft. Knudson's cross-motion for 
summary judgment until the completion of discovery has been done 
for both motions."2 [R. 273] ATGF had the right to rely upon those 
statements, and did so. ATGF was unjustly surprised when a 
decision was rendered. 
The interests of justice require that the judgment be set 
aside on the basis of surprise. 
B. A Showing of Mistake Has Been Made. 
The simple fact of the matter is that the Trial Court had 
forgotten about the posture of the case at the time that it 
rendered a decision. As explained in the Trial Court's own 
memorandum, dated September 25, 1997, when the Trial Court 
received the notice to submit for decision it erroneously 
2
 The statement appears with respect to the docket entry for 
February 25, 1997. The statement came after similar earlier 
statements by the Trial Court. See the Brief of Appellant, 
statement of facts, fact nos. 12 through 14. 
2 
concluded that the motion was unopposed. The Trial Court stated 
that plaintiffs had missed a deadline under Rule 4-501, C.J.A. and 
that missing such a deadline was an insufficient basis to set 
aside the summary judgment.3 [R. 265-267] 
The interests of justice require that the judgment be set 
aside on the basis of mistake by the Trial Court. 
C. A Showing of Excusable Neglect Has Been Made. 
Knudson did not file a new motion for summary judgment, which 
would have afforded ATGF the opportunity to respond and to present 
its evidence in the form of the Affidavit from Karen James. An 
order to show cause was not issued. Notice was not given that the 
Trial Court had changed its mind concerning its statement that a 
decision would not be rendered until discovery was completed. 
Knudson did nothing more that file another notice to submit for 
decision. 
Contrary to Knudson's assertions, ATGF was not guilty of 
"general procedural neglect." General procedural neglect would 
arise if an actual deadline was missed as a result of neglect in 
general. Heath v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1975) (cited 
by Knudson). 
3 See Brief of the Appellant, statement of facts, fact no. 19. 
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In the present case, ATGF was engage it is discovery and it 
did ultimately obtain the affidavit of Karen James demonstrating 
the actual knowledge and fraudulent intent of Knudson, just as 
ATGF had informed the Trial Court. ATGF did so by obtaining the 
evidence from a named defendant through an informal discovery 
process that was ultimately prudent and less costly that if ATGF 
had served the defendant and obtained the same information through 
formal discovery. ATGF timely filed its Rule 56(f) Affidavits in 
each instance and was otherwise attentive to the matter. Under 
the circumstances, as described above and in the Brief of 
Appellant, the failure of ATGF to obtain the affidavit earlier 
must be characterized as "excusable" neglect. The surprise and 
the mistake described above may, therefore, also fall within the 
scope of "excusable neglect." 
The interests of justice require that the judgment be set 
aside on the basis of excusable neglect. 
II. THE APPELLATE COURT MUST DEFER TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
INITIAL FINDING THAT ADDITIONAL TIME FOR DISCOVERY WAS 
WARRANTED UNDER RULE 56(f). 
As quoted by Knudson in the Brief of Appellee, the appellate 
court reviews three factors when considering whether a moving 
party's affidavit was sufficient to merit a Rule 56(f) 
continuance: 
4 
"(1) Where the reasons articulated in the Rule 56(f) 
affidavit 'adequate' or is the party against whom summary 
judgment is sough merely on a fishing expedition' for purely 
speculative facts after substantial discovery has been 
conducted without producing any significant evidence? (2) Was 
sufficient time since the inception of the lawsuit for the 
party against whom the summary judgment is sought to use 
discovery procedures, and thereby cross-examine the moving 
party? (3) If discovery procedures were timely initiated, was 
the non-moving party afforded an appropriate response?" 
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah App. 
1987) (cited by defendant). 
The first of two reasons that the Trial Court determined that 
a continuance was appropriate was that ATGF expressly informed the 
Trial Court that there was a witness, Karen James, that would 
provide evidence of the knowledge and fraudulent intent of Knudson 
at the time of his actions slandering the title of the property in 
question. 
The second reason that the Trial Court determined that a 
continuance was appropriate was because the case was newly filed 
and virtually no formal discovery had been conducted. ATGF moved 
for summary judgment quickly after the case was filed on the basis 
that there was no need for the discoverable evidence of knowledge 
and intent. Knudson did not contest his knowledge and intent. 
Instead, he only made a legal argument that evidence of knowledge 
and intent was not in the form of evidence. On other legal 
grounds not requiring a showing of knowledge and intent, summary 
5 
judgment was appropriate in favor of ATGF. Therefore, when 
Knudson filed a cross motion for summary judgment referring to all 
causes of action, including those with respect to which knowledge 
and intent were material potentially disputed facts, it was 
appropriate to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit. 
The Appellate Court must defer to the Trial Court's finding 
that additional time for discovery was warranted in the case. 
Without any action by Knudson to submit further evidence on 
the subject of knowledge and intent, there was a vacuum of actual 
submitted evidence before the Trial Court. Informal discovery 
with the necessary third party was being conducted. Knudson's 
deposition was not yet needed and had not yet been scheduled. 
Therefore, the Rule 56(f) affidavit should have been honored, 
particularly in light of the Trial Court's statements that the 
Rule 56(f) affidavit had been accepted, and the reliance of ATGF 
thereon. 
Even if the Appellate Court were to assume that the Trial 
Court entered a judgment based on an unexpressed finding that a 
further continuance under Rule 56(f) was unwarranted--as opposed 
to the actual mistake by the Trial Court which is clearly 
expressed in the record—the Appellate Court should find that the 
Trial Court committed an abuse of discretion in doing so. The 
Appellate Court should not assume that the Trial Court altered its 
6 
decision concerning the Rule 56(f) issue. The record is to the 
contrary. However, even if the Appellate Court makes such an 
assumption for purposes of finding some justification for the 
Trial Court's action, then the Appellate Court must acknowledge 
that such a decision by the Trial Court under the circumstances 
constituted a surprise or otherwise gives rise to a finding of 
excusable neglect on the part of ATGF, or that ATGF is otherwise 
entitled to have the judgment in question set aside in order to 
prevent an injustice in this case. 
Ill, KNUDSON WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT: AND 
ATGF WAS ENTITLED TO RELY ON ITS PLEADINGS 
WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT 
BECAUSE KNUDSON PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE TO 
REMOVE THE ISSUE BEYOND THE PLEADINGS, 
The merits underlying summary judgment are properly before 
this Court. Knudson's argument that the decision of the Trial 
Court was based solely on Rule 56(f) makes no sense. Even if the 
Trial Court concluded that it would change its position on the 
timing of its decision to disallow further discovery, the burden 
still rested upon Knudson to establish that summary judgment was 
appropriate. 
Further, because Knudson did not submit any affidavit or 
other evidence denying his knowledge and intent in committing 
insurance fraud, ATGF was entitled to rely on its pleadings and 
7 
the absence of dispute without submitting evidence on the issue.4 
Subject to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(f), Rule 56(e) 
provides: 
"When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." 
Therefore, ATGF did establish the elements of knowledge and intent 
as disputed material facts even before the Affidavit of Karen 
James was submitted to the Trial Court. 
A. David Knudson Is Liable For Unjust Enrichment And ATGF 
Is Entitled To Restitution. 
Knudson argues that Restatement of Restitution, section 23, 
at 101, including comment b., cited in the Brief of Appellant, is 
not Utah law. However, Restatement of Restitution, section 23, at 
4 Had Knudson filed and affidavit denying his knowledge and 
intent, then ATGF would now have the right to move the Trial Court 
to set aside the judgment on the basis of fraud upon the court 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b). The 
Affidavit of Karen James proves that such statement, had Knudson 
submitted such evidence, would have been fraudulent. 
The fact that Knudson did not make an affidavit or submit 
other evidence to establish that he did not have the knowledge and 
intent to commit the insurance fraud in question is the very 
reason that the law provides, as it does that the opposing party 
need not respond with counter evidence. See Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 56(e). Until evidence is presented, the pleadings 
of the parties are the appropriate statement as to the existence 
of a material disputed fact. 
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101 is cited by the Utah Supreme Court in Utah State Dept, of 
Social Servs. v. Toscano, 624 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1981). Knudson 
attempts to distinguish that case on the basis that there was not 
a contract between the parties in that case. However, Knudson 
ignores the fact that the Restatement being quoted by the Utah 
Supreme Court does not make such a distinction. 
In order to make the leap describe above, Knudson further 
alleges on appeal that there was no misleading act upon which a 
claim of unjust enrichment may be made. Knudson argues that there 
was a valid, binding contract between ATGF and Knudson that 
removes the matter from the scope of equitable remedies. 
Knudson's argument blatantly ignores the facts. Knudson admitted 
from the very outset that the insurance money was wrongfully paid. 
[R. 98-101] Implicit in that acknowledgement of Knudson is the 
acknowledgement that the written instruments obtained at the time 
of payment were the result of the same mistake. 
Restatement of Restitution, section 23, at 101 requires only 
a showing of mistake in payment in order to require restitution. 
It was undisputed that the payment was made by mistake. It is not 
enough for Knudson to allege on appeal that ATGF might have had 
the opportunity to discover the mistake. 
Moreover, construed in the light most favorable to ATGF, 
payment was made and the documents in question were executed 
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simultaneously as a result of Knudson's insurance fraud. Even 
without the Affidavit of Karen James, ATGF's pleadings and 
evidence presented were entitled to be construed in the light most 
favorable to ATGF. At the very least, there was a dispute as to 
the material facts. 
B. The Documents Recorded By David Knudson In Connection 
With The Sheriffs' Sale Constituted A Wrongful Lien, 
The Trial Court concluded that a showing of knowledge and 
intent on the part of Knudson at the time of his actions was 
material to the wrongful lien statute. If evidence was presented 
of knowledge and intent, the Trial Court would have granted the 
motion for summary judgment filed by ATGF. This was the reason 
that the Trial Court deferred its decision until completion of 
discovery for "both motions." [R. 273] Contrary to Knudson's 
argument, as the Trial Court determined, all of the other elements 
of Wrongful Lien were properly met. 
On the other hand, Utah Code Ann., section 38-9-1 (1994) does 
not require such a showing. Instead, the statute focuses on the 
response of the defendant after the error has been brought to the 
attention of the defendant. Damages are applied "if he willfully 
refuses to release or correct such document of record within 20 
days from the date of written request from the owner or beneficial 
title holder of the real property." 
10 
ATGF, in its position through subrogation as the owner or 
beneficial title holder, made written demand. Knudson willfully 
refused to correct the effects of his wrongfully filed execution 
against the property. At the time of the demand, ATGF plainly 
showed that the execution was wrongful. Without regard to the 
knowledge of Knudson (which has since been established by the 
affidavit of Karen James as an undisputed fact), Knudson admitted 
his knowledge at the time of the written demand to correct. The 
mere fact that Knudson was not at that time the party holding the 
judgment or engaged in execution against the property does not 
destroy his ability to correct the effects of his filing which was 
wrongful at the time it was filed. 
C. David Knudson Is Liable For Slander Of Title, 
Knudson does not deny that he slandered the title of the 
owner of the property when he filed his execution against it. 
Knudson claims that ATGF cannot bring an action for slander of 
title if it did not own the property in question. Knudson's 
argument ignores the fact that ATGF is bringing this action in its 
own name under the principle of subrogation. ATGF is in the shoes 
of the owner of the property. 
Knudson does not deny that ATGF suffered a loss when it paid 
Knudson to prevent the execution. Knudson attempts to 
characterize the payment as an arm's length business transaction, 
11 
as though ATGF wanted to purchase the judgment rather than stop 
the execution. The fact remains, that ATGF did suffer a pecuniary 
loss as a result of Knudson's slander of title. 
Knudson does not dispute that he knew and should have known 
that the documents he filed pursuant to his execution against the 
Subject Property constituted false claims against the Subject 
Property. Defendant Knudson's own motion for summary judgment 
challenged only the malice element of plaintiffs' cause of action 
for Slander of Title. Defendant Knudson asserted that plaintiffs 
had not presented evidence sufficient to establish the malice 
element. As discussed above, without an affidavit from Knudson, 
ATGF was entitled to refer to its pleadings, and did not at that 
stage require the affidavit of Karen James which was later 
produced.5 
Moreover, as discussed in the Brief of Appellant, the other 
facts presented to the Trial Court, construed in the light most 
favorable to ATGF, established the element of malice. Knudson's 
argument on appeal that his false notice was "inadvertent rather 
than calculated" is simply legal argument without basis in fact or 
5 See footnote 4 and accompanying text. 
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logic.6 Knudson actively sought to execute the judgment against 
the property in question. He knew he was going to hurt the owner 
of the property. His calculated actions in researching the 
existence of the judgment on a parcel of property insured by title 
insurance, purchasing the judgment from the judgment holder, and 
then executing without regard to the release of the property from 
the judgment, was a calculated act and not an "inadvertent" error. 
CONCLUSION 
Amid a host of very thin arguments, Knudson still has not 
asserted as a "fact" or in the form of evidence that the insurance 
money was paid to him when it should not have been. It would be 
unjust not to permit the claims of ATGF to be heard on the merits, 
where all parties and the Courts acknowledge that a wrong has been 
done which can still be corrected. 
Wherefore, ATGF requests that the Appellate Court reverse the 
judgment entered by the Trial Court, reverse the Trial Court's 
order denying that the judgment be set aside under Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b), and remand this matter to the Trial 
6 it should be noted that Knudson's arguments are legal argument 
concerning the construction of facts based on the absence of 
evidence submitted, and that they are not based on evidence of 
facts actually presented by Knudson in the form of affidavits or 
otherwise. Therefore, the relevant facts are subject to dispute 
by reason of the pleadings and by construction in the light most 
favorable to ATGF. See footnote 4 and accompanying text. 
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Court for adjudication on the merits on the basis of further 
motion and/or trial. 
DATED this 7M day of February, 1999. 
Thor B. Roundy u 
Attorney for Appellant 
14 
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